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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
Leslie Alder (now known as Leslie Roberts, but referred to throughout 
this Brief at "Leslie Alder" or "Ms. Alder") and Jackie Jones originally sued the 
following named defendants: Miles, Inc., a corporation, AGFA Corporation, a 
corporation, and Bayer Corporation, a corporation. 
Counsel for Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones, on the one hand, and for the 
originally named defendants, on the other hand, agreed that, for all purposes, 
including but not limited to tort liability of any and all of the originally named 
entities, and for simplicity's sake, the case could proceed against one named 
entity only. That entity is the currently named defendant: Bayer Corporation, 
AGFA Division (hereinafter "AGFA"). 
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VI 
L STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final Order of the Third Judicia l District 
Court of Salt Lake County (the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod). This Cour t h a s 
jur isdict ion over this Appeal p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(3)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it 
determined (1) tha t AGFA owed Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder no duty of care; (2) 
t ha t Ms. J o n e s and Ms. Alder cannot establish causat ion of any of their 
damages without proving the precise level of their chemical exposure; a n d (3) 
t ha t Ms. J o n e s and Ms. Alder cannot establish tha t they were damaged 
because the medical evidence regarding their illnesses is not based u p o n 
inherent ly reliable scientific or medical foundation and is therefore 
inadmissible; and when it, accordingly, ordered summary judgmen t in AGFA'S 
favor. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable s t andard of appellate review of summary j u d g m e n t s h a s 
been stated, by this Court, in Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 
1993), a s follows: 
In reviewing a summary judgment , we affirm only if there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entit led to 
judgmen t a s a mat ter of law. E.g., Estate Landscape and Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 
P.2d 322, 324 (Utah 1992); Hill v. Seattle First Na t l Bank, 827 
P.2d 2 4 1 , 242 (Utah 1992); Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338 
(Utah 1987). In reviewing a ruling on a motion for s u m m a r y 
judgment , we review the trial court 's legal conclusions for 
correctness. E.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 , 247 (Utah 
1988). 
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The issue was preserved in the trial court by the filing of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [R 
1721-2229], at oral argument on that Motion, by the post-hearing submission 
of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder [R 2342-2358], and by the filing of the Notice of 
Appeal dated October 27, 2000 [R 2370-2371]. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT. 
This case involves the claims of Jackie Jones and Leslie Alder for 
compensation for the illnesses and damages they allegedly sustained during 
their employment as radiography technologists at LDS Hospital. Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder allegedly developed serious and permanent illnesses over the 
course of a two-year period following the relocation and reinstallation of AGFA's 
Curix Compact Daylight Processing machine in a new, improperly ventilated 
work area. AGFA participated in the relocation of its machine and was 
responsible for its installation. AGFA is alleged, among other things, to have 
been negligent with respect to the installation of its Curix machine in the 
Mammography Department at LDS Hospital, and with respect to its failure to 
warn Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder of the dangers involved in working near the 
machine without adequate ventilation. 
AGFA filed a motion for summary judgment contending that it owed Ms. 
Alder and Ms. Jones no duty of care; that all of the illnesses complained of by 
Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones were Multiple Chemical Sensitivity; that Multiple 
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Chemical Sensitivity is not a valid illness or disease entity; and that Ms. Alder 
and Ms. Jones could not prove that they had been subjected to toxic "doses" of 
harmful chemicals. That Motion was vigorously contested, on all fronts, by Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder. Oral argument was held on that Motion. The Third 
District Court (the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod) took the matter under 
advisement and ultimately granted that Motion. The District Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment is dated October 4, 2000. The Notice of Appeal 
was filed in the District Court on October 27, 2000, and in this Court on 
October 30, 2000. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
BACKGROUND 
In 1991, Tim Murray went to work for AGFA as a Field Service Engineer 
for the state of Utah and was responsible for servicing AGFA products at LDS 
Hospital in Salt Lake City. When Mr. Murray started working for AGFA, he 
was required to study a series of Chemical Safety Modules and was tested on 
the information contained in the Modules. The Modules repeatedly stressed 
the danger of the inhalation of fumes from the chemicals used in the subject 
processor. [R 1887] Mr. Murray acknowledged that he was aware of the 
necessity of adequate ventilation in rooms where the processor was used. [R 
1889-90] AGFA's installation guidelines specify a minimum air exchange rate 
of 10 or 15 times the room volume per hour. Mr. Murray acknowledged that 
one of the reasons why adequate ventilation is stressed is that it is important 
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that chemical vapors put off by the processor be removed from the room. [R 
1891] 
Mr. Murray acknowledged that AGFA participated in the installation of 
the processor in its new location. [R 1893-94] Mr. Murray testified that he 
connected the processor to a possible exhaust vent in the ceiling of the new 
room. [R 1870-71]1 Notwithstanding Mr. Murray's participation in the 
installation of the processor, and his serious doubts regarding a possible 
"exhaust vent's" ability to exhaust fumes from the new room, Mr. Murray 
admitted that he did not test the ventilation in the room. [R 1894] 
Sometime subsequent to the installation of the processor in its new 
location, Mr. Murray received complaints from Ms. Jones that she had lost her 
voice and had tightness in her chest. [R 1892] After learning that Ms. Jones 
was getting sick from the fumes in the room, Mr. Murray became aware that 
the ceiling vent was not working properly and "wasn't exhausting a lot of air." 
[R 1872] Mr. Murray acknowledged that AGFA installation guidelines apply to 
him, as a technician and installer, and require him to be concerned with the 
ventilation of the rooms where processors are installed. [R 1873] When Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder became sick, Mr. Murray talked to other AGFA 
representatives, including George Cervenka. [R 1874-77] Mr. Cervenka was 
AGFA'S product specialist at that time and told Mr. Murray "to have the room 
1
 Pages 1870-1883 of the Record are out of order as they were inadvertently placed under 
Exhibit B (excerpts from William Patrick Bendall's deposition) to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to AGFA'S Motion for Summary Judgment In fact, pages 1870-1883 of the Record 
are pages from Tim Murray's deposition (excerpts of that deposition constitute Exhibit C to that 
Memorandum in Opposition) and those pages should, as parts of the Murray deposition, be 
read as falling between pages 1894 and 1895 of the Record 
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checked." Mr. Murray did not check the ventilation in the room, in spite of Mr. 
Cervenka's directive that he do so. [R 1877] Mr. Cervenka wanted Mr. Murray 
to have the room checked to determine whether the ventilation was sufficient to 
get the fumes out of the room. [R 1878] 
Sometime in March 1995, Mr. Murray, at the Hospital's request, installed 
an AGFA "vent kit" to try to improve the fume problems. The vent kit consisted 
of internal PVC piping that connected with the machine's hose and ran up to 
the ceiling vent. [R 1879] Mr. Murray had by then become concerned that the 
lack of ventilation was causing Ms. Jones' health problems. [R 1883] 
Notwithstanding his concern, Mr. Murray never inquired whether the hospital 
conducted any tests on the ventilation of the new room. [R 1895] Mr. Murray 
does not recall ever suggesting better venting to anyone at the hospital. [R 
1896] 
LDS Hospital's Pat Bendall has testified that AGFA was "in the loop" from 
the beginning when Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder made their first complaints 
regarding the ventilation problem in the room and, eventually, regarding their 
health problems. [R 1854] Mr. Bendall relied on the expertise of the AGFA 
people with respect to safely ventilating the workplace. [R 1855] AGFA never 
conducted any tests to determine the ventilation or air-exchange rates in the 
new room. [R 1865] 
At the Hospital's request, Utah Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH) 
inspected the subject Mammography processing area after an outside wall vent 
was finally installed and reported that it at that time had a satisfactory air-
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exchange rate of twenty five air changes per hour. UOSH also confirmed that 
the mammography room initially had only two air changes per hour. UOSH 
noted that AGFA's Curix machine used a developer containing the chemicals 
glutaraldehyde and hydroquinone, stating "[ejmployees may have been 
sensitized to the chemicals in the fixer and the developer before the ventilation 
system was changed." 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were employed by Intermountain Health Care 
("IHC") at L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah as Radiography Technologists 
for 17 and 15 years respectively. Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were, by reason of 
their subject illnesses, required to discontinue their employment, and careers, 
as radiography technologists in June 1995. 
From February 1993 through June 1995, Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder 
worked as full-time radiography technologists with the processor in the new 
location. [R 1899] Prior to February 1993, Ms. Alder was in generally good 
health and had not experienced any symptoms that she attributes to her work 
as an x-ray technologist. [R 1900-04] Prior to February 1993, with the 
exception of a lower back problem and diabetes, Ms. Jones was also in 
generally good health and had not experienced any symptoms that she 
attributes to her work as an x-ray technologist. [R 1920-22, 1935] 
After the processor was relocated to the new area in February 1993, Ms. 
Jones complained that the air in her workplace seemed hot and stagnant. [R 
1920-22] Ms. Jones' initial illness symptoms included hoarseness, difficulty 
breathing and chest pains. Ms. Jones' symptoms eventually included watery 
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eyes, red skin, nausea, muscle aches, dizziness, joint pain, ear-aches, runny 
nose, confusion, memory loss, slow-healing and severe fatigue. Ms. Jones 
testified that she did not begin to experience the full gamut of these symptoms 
until sometime towards the very end of her career in 1995. [R 1938-41, 1944-
46] Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones believe that they first connected their symptoms 
to chemical exposure when another technician began complaining of the same 
symptoms sometime in late 1994 or early 1995. [R 1910-11, 1942] 
MEDICAL TESTIMONY/ RECORDS 
a. Anthony Suruda, M.D., M.P.H. 
Eventually, Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were referred by their employer to 
Anthony Suruda, M.D., M.P.H. for an examination to determine if they had 
suffered from occupational exposure to chemicals. Dr. Suruda is employed at 
the Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and Environmental Health, 
University of Utah, and diagnosed Ms. Alder as having Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivity (MCS), possible asthma and a history of depression. Dr. Suruda 
recommended that Ms. Alder not work in departments where glutaraldehyde is 
used or where air from those departments is recirculated into the building. [R 
1958-68] Dr. Suruda diagnosed Ms. Jones as having MCS, diabetes and 
hypertension. Dr. Suruda recommended that Ms. Jones not work in 
departments where glutaraldehyde is used or where air from those 
departments is recirculated into the building. [R 1958-68] Dr. Suruda testified 
that glutaraldehyde is a known irritant, and that he believes he smelled 
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glutaraldehyde over the processor when he visited the workplace of Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder. [R 1974] 
b. Deborah Robinson, M.D. 
Dr. Robinson, a medical doctor and Ms. Alder's primary care physician, 
conducted a differential diagnosis of Ms. Alder. Dr. Robinson explained that in 
order to perform a differential diagnosis, a physician must get a history from 
the patient and rule out (to the physician's satisfaction) other potential 
explanations for the patient's specific problem. [R 1986-88] Dr. Robinson 
diagnosed Ms. Alder with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and MCS in association 
with Fibromyalgia. [R 1977] 
According to Dr. Robinson, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome is a compilation of 
various symptoms that together constitute a diagnosis. She states that "there 
have been reports dating back over a hundred years of this syndrome, but it 
hasn't been formally recognized perhaps until the last five to ten years." CFS is 
now, however, a recognized diagnosis. [R 1978] Dr. Robinson also testified 
that Fibromyalgia is a rheumatological diagnosis, consisting of another 
constellation of symptoms, without serological or a laboratory abnormality for 
diagnosis. In spite of the lack of objective "laboratory" evidence of this 
syndrome, she testified that it is a recognized diagnosis. [R 1979] 
In Dr. Robinson's opinion, Ms. Alder has a problem in neurocognitive 
function and has some dysfunction in her ability to think. Dr. Robinson has 
independently analyzed the result of neuropsychogical tests administered to 
Ms. Alder. According to Dr. Robinson, "there are demonstrable abnormalities 
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in Ms. Alder's neuropsychometric testing that would suggest that she would 
have difficulty in performing tasks she could previously do." [R 1980-82] Dr. 
Robinson did not see anything in Ms. Alder's neuropsychological test results 
that indicate she is malingering. [R 1983] In Dr. Robinson's opinion, Ms. 
Alder's test results indicate to a reasonable degree of medical probability that 
Ms. Alder suffered some form of chemical insult. [R 1984] Dr. Robinson 
further opined, to a degree of medical probability, that there is a part of Ms. 
Alder's brain that has been damaged. [R 1985] 
In Dr. Robinson's opinion, Ms. Alder is disabled in terms of her ability to 
function in the job she previously held because she cannot be exposed to 
chemicals and that she is unable, by reason of the inconsistency of day-to-day 
pain and fatigue, to report every day to a job from eight to five. [R 1989] Dr. 
Robinson has opined that Ms. Alder's CFS was caused by chemical exposure in 
her workplace and that MCS and Fibromyalgia co-exist with Ms. Alder's CFS. 
Dr. Robinson testified that "[c]ertainly the chemical smell sensitivity and the 
basic symptoms of Ms. Alder's Chronic Fatigue had an onset at the time of her 
exposure." [R 1991-92] 
The fact that the constellation of Ms. Alder's medical problems and 
illnesses has been referred to as "MCS" does not alter Dr. Robinson's opinion 
that Ms. Alder suffers from real illnesses and is disabled as a result thereof. [R 
1994] Dr. Robinson testified that even though science has not yet defined the 
pathway of the CFS or MCS disease processes, one can still conclude to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability that those syndromes occur in 
9 
association with certain exposures, and that, based upon Ms. Alder's history of 
being exposed to chemicals in the workplace and then having an onset of 
symptoms that meet the definition of CFS and MCS, one can reasonably 
conclude to a degree of medical probability that Ms. Alder's conditions were 
brought on by her exposure to chemicals in the workplace in which the AGFA 
Curix machine was relocated. [R 1995] 
c. Lucinda Bateman, M.D.2 
Dr. Lucinda Bateman, Ms. Jones' primary care physician, has opined 
that Ms. Jones was disabled from performing her regular job because of 
chemical exposure. [R 1951-56] Dr. Bateman believes that Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivity is a valid disease entity. [R 2003] In treating and diagnosing Ms. 
Jones, Dr. Bateman reviewed medical records and reports prepared by Ms. 
Jones7 other physicians. [R 2004] 
According to Dr. Bateman, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Fibromyalgia 
can be caused by a chemical exposure. [R 2005] Dr. Bateman testified that 
she saw no evidence of malingering on the part of Ms. Jones. [R 2006] Dr. 
Bateman diagnosed Ms. Jones with MCS. Specifically, Dr. Bateman stated that 
she believes Ms. Jones "is ill, and her symptoms fit under Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivity the best." [R 2007] Dr. Bateman believes the most likely cause of 
Ms. Jones ' MCS is her chemical exposure in the workplace. [R 2008-09] Dr. 
2
 Dr. Bateman is a board certified general internist. She attended medical school at Johns 
Hopkins and completed her residency at the University of Utah. Dr. Bateman describes herself 
as a general internist with an interest in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivity, Fibromyalgia and atypical neurologic illness. [R 2000-01] She specializes in ill-
defined chronic illnesses and has published on the subject of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. [R 
2002] 
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Bateman has opined that the proposition that the cause of Ms. Jones ' 
symptoms is her occupational exposure to chemicals is provable from the 
standpoint that Ms. Jones was in her work environment for many years 
without problems and then, when the Curix machine was relocated into the 
new area with inadequate ventilation, she began to develop her current health 
problems. [R 2010] Dr. Bateman has correlated Ms. Jones ' symptoms to her 
workplace exposure by reviewing Ms. Jones' history and the temporal 
relationship that exists between the onset of her illness and the ventilation 
problems in her workplace. [R 2011] 
d. Janiece Pompa, Ph.D.3 
Dr. Pompa administered a series of neuropsychological tests to Ms. 
Jones and prepared an evaluation based upon Ms. Jones ' test results. Dr. 
Pompa's findings and conclusions are as follows: 
In summary, Ms. Jones displays significant cognitive deficits, which she 
ascribes to exposure to toxic chemicals. There is no literature with 
regard to the neuropsychological effects of exposure to hydroquinone and 
glutaraldehyde, or x-ray processing fluid. In the case of solvent 
exposure, neurological examination is usually normal, except in the most 
severe cases. However, subclinical neuropsychological effects are often 
seen earlier in the exposure history. These include headache, dizziness, 
fatigue, parasthesias, pain, weakness, and memory disturbance. Severe 
exposure is capable of causing dementia, involving deficits in memory, 
judgment, abstract thought and other cortical functions, as well as 
changes in personality and behavior. Since Ms. Jones does complain of 
many of these symptoms, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that 
her neuropsychological deficits could have been caused by chemical 
exposure. It is unlikely that her complaints constitute a pre-existing 
condition, as her memory and attentional deficits are so pronounced that 
3
 Dr. Pompa is a licensed psychologist and specializes in the fields of Child Psychology and 
Neuropsychology. She completed a minor in Neuropsychology in graduate school, a 
predoctoral internship with a neuropsychology rotation and one year post-doctoral residency in 
child neuropsychology at Primary Children's Medical Center. [R 2014] 
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she would not have been able to keep a job, much less a supervisory 
position. 
[R 2022-36] The medical literature relied upon by Dr. Pompa provides a 
general description of many of the common neuropsychological consequences 
of chemical exposure in general. Based upon this literature, and on her 
background, training, education, experience, and her work with Ms. Jones, Dr. 
Pompa determined that Ms. Jones ' pattern of cognitive deficits seemed to be 
reasonably related to her chemical exposure. [R 2015] Dr. Pompa has 
testified that she believes, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that 
Ms. Jones ' cognitive deficits observed in Dr. Pompa's testing were caused by 
the chemical exposure she suffered in her workplace. [R 2016-18] 
e. Michael Gray, M.D., M.P.H.4 
Dr. Gray has been a treating physician for Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. He 
utilized the differential diagnosis method in evaluating and diagnosing the 
health conditions of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. [R 2063] Dr. Gray diagnosed 
Ms. Alder as having (1) glutaraldehyde exposure and toxicity; (2) activated 
4
 Dr. Gray, San Pedro Valley Medical Association, Benson, Arizona, completed his medical 
degree in 1974 at the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine. He then completed a three-
year residency in Internal Medicine at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. He also 
obtained a Master's degree in Public Health and in 1978 was appointed the Director of 
Occupational Medicine at the Arizona Center for Occupational Medicine. He also served as an 
assistant professor of Internal Medicine and has published numerous articles. [R 2038-49] 
Dr. Gray participated in the authorship of 13 monographs that were eventually distributed to 
various medical schools nationwide for use in their curricula. One of the monographs 
identified glutaraldehye as a chemical that was hazardous to hospital workers. [R 2052-58] 
Although he is not certified, Dr. Gray has training in Industrial Hygiene; he also has training 
and experience in the field of Neurology. [R 2059-60] A summary of some of the data Dr. Gray 
has collected and that factored into his clinical assessment of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder was 
published in the proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Agency of Toxic Substances 
Disease Registry in May, 1994. This publication was also peer-reviewed and edited. [R 2061]. 
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cellular immunity (immune toxicity), (3) toxic encephalopathy (mild to 
moderate), (4) reactive airways disease, and (5) latex sensitivity (health care 
related). Dr. Gray concluded that Ms. Alder was temporarily totally disabled. 
[R 2103-09] Dr. Gray diagnosed Ms. Jones as having glutaraldehyde exposure, 
immune toxicity with evidence of excessive auto immunity and toxic 
encephalopathy by history. He advised Ms. Jones to stay off work and opined 
that her condition constituted a total disability. He reviewed Ms. Jones' past 
medical records and opined that "her symptoms and overall condition are 
directly related to the exposures which she sustained to glutaraldehyde in the 
workplace/' [R 2096-2102] 
Dr. Gray concluded that because of the temporal relationship between 
the onset of Ms. Jones ' illnesses and her relocation to a work area with 
inadequate ventilation substantiates, the clinical correlation, and the 
differential diagnostic process results "in a diagnosis of x-ray developer reagent 
induced immune toxicity with associated toxic encephalopathy." [R 2081] The 
laboratory tests Dr. Gray performed on Ms. Jones confirm, to his satisfaction, 
that she is reactive to the chemical fumes in her workplace. [R 2083] 
With respect to identifying the chemicals that have caused the illnesses 
of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, Dr. Gray testified as follows: 
It is my considered medical opinion, based on the differential diagnosis 
and general clinical assessment of these two individuals, that their 
exposure in the context in question to a mixture of chemicals emanating 
from the developer were sufficient to do the job. Now we can speculate 
on which of the components might have been more or less likely to 
contribute to the reaction, but the bottom line is that the reality of the 
situation was that they were exposed to a mixture, not to just one 
compound. 
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[R 2085] (Emphasis added). He further testified: 
After reviewing the materials in my files relating to Leslie Alder and 
Jackie Jones in this matter and the environmental circumstances, I 
believe that the mixture of chemicals, which included hydroquinone, 
glutaraldehyde and sulfur dioxide and some amounts of ammonia, 
created conditions necessary and sufficient to induce immunotoxicity in 
both of these patients as they are manifesting and exhibiting, both in the 
context of the symptoms they are describing and the neuropsych profiles 
that have been generated regarding them. The deficits of which, I think, 
related to those exposures. From that standpoint, I believe that we can 
say that the aggregate impact of the exposure to the combination of 
compounds in the manner in which the ingestions occurred did indeed 
induce toxic encephalopathy. 
[R 2086] (Emphasis added). 
Dr. Gray believes it is highly significant that these two patients were able 
to work for so many years in their field without problem and then, with the 
relocation of their workplace to a room with inadequate ventilation, their 
illnesses and problems began to arise. [R 2089] 
f. Mark R. Cullen, M.D.5 
Dr. Cullen testified that the diagnostic criteria for MCS are (1) that the 
patient has been in stable, generally good health prior to some environmental 
exposure; and (2) that there was some symptomatic response to the 
5
 Dr. Cullen is a Professor of Medicine in Public Health at Yale University School of Medicine 
and the Director of the Yale New Haven Occupational and Environmental Medicine Program. 
[R 2127] Dr. Cullen is also a medical consultant for the International Chemical Workers Union 
and a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the University of Iowa Persian Gulf 
Veterans Study, a former member of the NIOSH Board of Scientific Counselors and a member 
of the DuPont Epidemiology Review Board. [R 2128] Dr. Cullen is board certified in Internal 
Medicine and Preventive Medicine in the Occupational Medicine Subspecialty. [R 2126] Dr. 
Cullen is a member of the American College of Physicians, American Public Health Association, 
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, and Association of 
occupational and Environmental Clinics. [R 2129] Dr. Cullen has performed studies and 
published articles on Multiple Chemical Sensitivity and, in fact, "coined" that term. [R 2130, 
2133] 
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environmental exposure which reoccurs at lower levels of exposure. Dr. Cullen 
further testified that the exposure does not have to be a sudden, acute event 
and the next two diagnostic criteria for MCS have to do with what is known as 
"generalization of the process" so that additional chemicals begin to bother the 
individual and the pattern of symptoms expand. According to Dr. Cullen: 
One of the things that always happens during this period is the 
development of some central nervous system type complaints, lack 
of concentration, confusion, dizziness, persistent headache. That's 
kind of a hallmark. So it's not just respiratory or skin, it's now 
something more systemic. 
[R2132] 
According to Dr. Cullen, MCS patients "are not making the symptoms 
up, [they] are very real, often extremely intense, life ruining symptoms, and 
therefore they have an underlying pathophysiologic basis." [R 2134] Dr. 
Cullen testified that there are objective ways to verify or confirm patients' 
subjective report of their symptoms. For example, the temporal relationship of 
their reported symptoms to their exposure are objective data in support of their 
subjective complaints. In addition, their behavior can provide objective 
evidence of their subjective complaints, and their past medical histories can 
provide objective evidence and validation that their subjective complaints arise 
out of the exposure event. [R 2135-36] According to Dr. Cullen, chemicals 
clearly play a role in causing MCS. [R 2137] 
Dr. Cullen testified that just because the medical community may not 
know everything there is to know about a disease entity doesn't make the 
disease any less real. One example given by Dr. Cullen is multiple sclerosis. 
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Similar to MCS, the medical community does not know enough about Multiple 
Sclerosis to know what causes the disease or to know how to effectively 
intervene to treat and/or prevent the disease. This lack of knowledge does not, 
however, make the disease any less real. [R 2138] Dr. Cullen testified that 
when treating MCS patients, it is important to perform a differential diagnosis. 
He further testified that a differential diagnosis does not involve distinguishing 
among exposures to different irritants to determine which irritant was the 
causative factor. In fact, he indicates that this is a singularly unrewarding 
task and is of no value. [R 2140-41] 
According to Dr. Cullen, glutaraldehyde and hydroquinone are irritating 
materials. In his opinion, there is significant circumstantial evidence that Ms. 
Alder and Ms. Jones were exposed to levels of one or both of these chemicals 
well in excess of their irritation thresholds. [R2157] 
Dr. Cullen testified that Ms. Alder's respiratory complaints, central 
nervous system complaints, and severe fatigue, triggered by intermittent 
periodic exposures to low level environmental irritants, make it appropriate to 
call her an MCS patient. Dr. Cullen believes that Ms. Alder's Fibromyalgia 
diagnosis is related to her MCS and is part of that disease entity. [R 2158-60] 
In Dr. Cullen's opinion, the record makes clear that Ms. Alder was working for 
more than a year in a problematic environment, and "the association between 
environmental exposures at low level and the triggering of symptoms is the sine 
quanonofMCS." [R 2161-62] 
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In formulating his opinions regarding Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, Dr. 
Cullen reviewed extensive medical records and spoke with each of them. [R 
2168-69] He testified that one of the hallmarks of MCS is that the patient 
does not improve once the initial exposure is remedied. It is of no surprise to 
him that Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's symptoms and medical conditions did not 
improve once the ventilation problem was corrected. Once a person develops 
MCS, any improvement in the ventilation is too little, too late: 
The problems that MCS patients have are not dose related. In the 
normal scheme of things the triggers vastly exceed their thresholds 
for response . . .they react to such relatively low levels of things 
that improving ten or a hundredfold the air quality is not 
important to them. It's not enough. It doesn't make much 
difference. 
[R 2173-74] 
Dr. Cullen testified that Ms. Alder could not possibly return to work as a 
radiographer and that there is good evidence that the ventilation in the subject 
workplace was woefully inadequate and he feels confident that "one of the 
chemicals involved in development, or all of them together, were important 
contributing features here". [R 2176] Dr. Cullen opined that Ms. Alder 
suffered functional neuropsychological impairments as a result of her MCS. [R 
2179] 
Dr. Cullen also performed a differential diagnosis of Ms. Jones. [R 2181] 
He concluded, from that diagnosis, that she suffers from MCS, [R 2181], and 
that her major chronic symptoms are muscle pain, impaired memory and 
fatigue [R 2182 ], and that her respiratory and voice symptoms and loss of 
balance occur with exposure to irritants. [R 2182] 
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Dr. Cullen testified that the onset of MCS is always associated with some 
chemical irritation or other chemical exposure or reaction. [R 2187] Ms. Jones ' 
positive reaction to a non-blind challenge test using glutaraldehyde supports 
Dr. Cullen's diagnosis that Ms. Jones suffers from MCS. [R 2188] He further 
testified that Ms. Jones ' negative test result for classic allergens on a skin and 
lung test is also supportive of his diagnosis because it rules out the possibility 
that Ms. Jones ' symptoms are the result of an allergy or asthma condition [R 
2188], and that Ms. Jones ' neuropsychological test results indicate a pattern 
that is commonly seen in patients with MCS. [R 2190] 
Dr. Cullen wrote: 
It appears virtually unquestionable from the contemporaneous 
record of complaints acknowledging the environment that the 
workplace environment of Ms. Alder resulted in significant 
respiratory and dermal irritation on a daily basis resulting in 
headache, severe upper respiratory congestion and discomfort, 
intermittent skin burning and fatigue. This constellation would 
fall at the extreme end of the condition now most commonly known 
as "Non Specific Building Related Illness" resulting from work in a 
poorly ventilated environment with multiple irritating substances 
present. 
It also appears evident from the clinical record . . . that the patient 
developed depression, likely reactive and in response to physical 
illness. 
. . . although most individuals suffering from repeat insults from 
upper respiratory irritants and suffering from the syndrome of 
"Non Specific Building Related Illness" do improve coincident with 
environmental improvements . . . Ms. Alder's illness appears to 
have been complicated prior to her removal from the work 
environment by the syndrome of "Multiple Chemical Sensitivities." 
Although the underlying basis for this complication remains 
uncertain in the scientific literature, it is overwhelmingly the best 
explanation for the exacerbation of symptoms through 1995, the 
development of symptomatic responses around environments 
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outside her work are and the development of more chronic and 
persistent problems such as fatigue and musculoskeletal pain. 
[R 2204-07] Dr. Cullen also opined that: 
. . . based on my experience with a very large number of similarly 
affected [patients], subjected throughout my clinical practice and 
research over the past decade and half at Yale, it would be my 
impression that Ms. Alder will not tolerate significant periods of 
time in environments that are characterized by significant 
chemical use and poor air quality. This may largely preclude her 
ability to work at her chosen profession and may even preclude 
working in any hospital environment, again based on my 
experience. 
[R 2204-07] 
With respect to Jackie Jones, Dr. Cullen made conclusions, after he 
completed her differential diagnosis, similar to those he made regarding Ms. 
Alder. Specifically, Dr. Cullen found: 
Based on the evidence regarding air quality between 1993 when 
Ms. Jones ' unit moved and 1995 when she discontinued work, it 
appears evident that Ms. Jones was exposed repeatedly to irritating 
industrial chemicals at levels substantially above those able to 
cause mucosal irritation and associated symptoms. The headache, 
difficulty concentrating, and upper respiratory symptoms 
particularly the hoarseness which she experienced during this time 
period, I believe can be directly attributable to those exposures as 
was suggested by almost all of the contemporaneous evaluations 
and supported by physical examination done at the time. 
[R 2200-03] Dr. Cullen also opined that Ms. Jones' increasing 
symptomatology, including a severe systemic component of fatigue, difficulties 
with concentration, muscle aches and depressive symptoms, occurred even 
after the remediation at her work area and persisted even after she was 
removed altogether from the work environment and: 
This pattern of intensifying symptoms occurring around and triggered 
by a range of environmental odors and low level chemical irritants in 
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an individual who has suffered from a two year occupational illness . . 
. is most consistent with a complication known as Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivities (MCS). 
[R 2200-03] 
Dr. Cullen acknowledged that there is considerable debate in the medical 
literature as to "the path of physiologic base for this complication"—not as to 
its existence. Based upon his review of the records and all the information 
available to him, Ms. Jones meets, in Dr. Cullen's opinion, the clinical criteria 
for the MCS disorder. [R 2200-03] 
Dr. Cullen also opined that "Ms. Jones will not likely succeed in 
returning to her prior occupation based both on her neuropsychological 
impairments as well as her reactivity to the chemical environment" and that it 
is "unlikely that she will succeed in returning to work in a hospital 
environment, again because the frequent nature of environmental irritants in 
that environment." [R 2200-03] Dr. Cullen testified that he holds the opinions 
expressed in his reports on Leslie Alder and Jackie Jones to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty. [R 2194] 
Dr. Cullen does not consider the subject of MCS to be "new science" in 
the scientific community. Indeed, according to Dr. Cullen this illness is the 
subject of at least 200 peer scientific literature publications written within the 
last decade. [R 2194] Dr. Cullen testified that "there is a preponderance of 
scientific observation and scientific literature suggesting that this pattern of 
illness is well described and describable." [R2195] Dr. Cullen has no doubt 
that the onset of illnesses suffered by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder resulted from 
20 
the chemical exposure they suffered in their workplace. Based upon his review 
of the records, it is his opinion that the chemical exposure in this case is well 
documented. [R2197] 
Dr. Cullen testified that the cause of MCS, "chemical exposure", is 
known, and that what is not yet understood in the medical community is what 
the exact pathway is between the first set of events [the chemical exposure] and 
the latter syndrome that develops. He does not, however, believe that the 
actual condition of MCS is in dispute, and it is his opinion that these women 
have the condition. [R 2195-97] Dr. Cullen testified that MCS is a distinct 
clinical syndrome that has reasonable criteria for diagnosis. [R 2198] 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
AGFA owed Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder several duties of care. AGFA had a 
duty to use reasonable care in the installation of the Curix machine in its new 
location, including the obligation to determine whether adequate ventilation 
was being provided. AGFA undertook the duty of installing the Curix machine 
in its new location in February 1993. It had a duty to exercise reasonable care 
in completing the task. 
AGFA also had a duty to provide safe equipment. At least as a matter of 
triable fact, AGFA knew or should have known that its machine was not safe 
for use in the new, inadequately ventilated, mammography room and owed Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder a duty of care not to provide the equipment without first 
making it safe for its intended use. This duty, at least as a matter of triable 
fact, required AGFA to refrain from installing its machine in the badly 
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ventilated workplace; promptly to place an available, AGFA-made "vent kit" on 
the machine to assist in venting the toxic fumes; and/or to advise the hospital 
that the AGFA machine could be used only in an area with better ventilation. 
AGFA had a duty to see that its machine was not operated in unsafe 
conditions. AGFA used and allowed its Curix machine to be used when it knew 
or should have known that the machine was inappropriate to be operated in 
areas that lacked adequate ventilation, and that operation under those 
conditions would involve an unreasonable risk of harm to Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder. 
AGFA owed a duty to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, by virtue of its 
contractual relationship with their employer, regarding the installation and 
servicing of the Curix machine. The reasonable performance of its contract 
with IHC required AGFA to properly install and service the Curix machine for 
the safety of IHC's employees who worked in the Mammography unit, including 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. 
AGFA also owed a duty to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder to warn them of the 
risks of working near the Curix machine without adequate ventilation. AGFA'S 
unquestionable abject failure to warn Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder regarding the 
risks associated with their use and operation of a piece of equipment AGFA 
provided, installed, and serviced subject AGFA to liability. 
With respect to illness causation, the inability of Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder to establish the exact levels of chemicals to which they were exposed over 
the course of the two-year period they worked in the new Mammography 
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department is no fault of their own and is not fatal to their claims. Standards 
created by governmental and/or industrial agencies are not necessarily 
"scientific" in nature and do not stand for the proposition that exposure to 
levels lower than those established as "standards" cannot cause injury. 
Furthermore, Ms Jones ' and Ms. Alder's medical experts have opined that, in 
addition to objective evidence of exposure to chemicals in the workplace, the 
temporal relationship between the inadequate ventilation of the workplace and 
the onset of symptoms establishes a causal connection between exposure to 
chemical fumes and the illnesses suffered by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. 
The testimony of the medical experts is based upon reliable, scientific 
methods and is not inadmissible under this Court's Rimmasch decision or any 
other controlling rule of law. In determining the admissibility of the medical 
testimony, the District Court could appropriately have concerned itself only 
with the methods upon which an expert opinions are based; it should not have 
judged the credibility of the opinions themselves. That task is specifically 
reserved for the trier of fact. In this case, the techniques and methods utilized 
by the witnesses in question are not "novel" or "new". 
The District Court committed reversible error when it granted AGFA'S 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
I. AGFA OWED MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER DUTIES OF CARE. 
A. AGFA HAD A DUTY TO USE REASONABLE CARE IN THE 
INSTALLATION OF THE CURIX MACHINE IN ITS NEW 
LOCATION, INCLUDING THE OBLIGATION TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER ADEQUATE VENTILATION WAS BEING PROVIDED. 
Under its contract with IHC, AGFA was responsible for the installation 
and servicing of the Curix machine. In February 1993, when IHC determined 
to relocate the machine in its new mammography department, AGFA was called 
in to assist with, and did assist with, the installation of the Curix machine in 
its new location. AGFA thus undertook the responsibility of appropriately 
installing the Curix machine. Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to 
the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to 
exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such 
harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third 
person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third 
person upon the undertaking. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 324A (emphasis added). This 
Restatement provision clearly applies to the facts of this case. As demonstrated 
by the testimony of AGFA's Service Representative, Tim Murray (see discussion 
and record citations set forth at pages 3-5, above), AGFA failed, in performing 
the undertaking of installing the Curix machine in its new location (at least as 
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a matter of triable fact), to use reasonable care in several respects, thereby 
increasing the risk of harm to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder.6 
Under Section 324A, when AGFA undertook to install the Curix machine 
in its new location, it assumed all duties attendant thereto, including the duty 
to see to it that there was adequate ventilation for the Curix machine to be 
safely operated in its new location. There is, at a minimum, a triable issue of 
material fact with respect to whether IHC relied upon AGFA'S expertise, 
training and knowledge with respect to the ventilation needs in the workplace. 
According to IHC's William Patrick Bendall, IHC, through Mr. Bendall, relied 
on the expertise of the AGFA people with respect to safely ventilating the 
workplace. [R 1855] 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that AGFA had a duty to use 
reasonable care in the installation of the Curix machine. That duty included, 
at a minimum, the duty to ascertain whether there was adequate ventilation for 
the safe operation of the machine in its new location. 
6
 Mr. Murray failed to act reasonably in his installation of the Curix machine. He failed to test 
the ventilation in the room when he initially installed the Curix machine, failed again to test 
the ventilation in the room when he developed concerns that the ceiling vent was not working 
properly, and failed once against to test the ventilation in the room after Plaintiffs began 
complaining about their health and he was specifically instructed to test the ventilation in the 
room by Agfa product specialist, George Cervenka. He admits that he became concerned that 
the lack of ventilation was causing Ms. Jones' health problems but did nothing to remedy the 
ventilation problems. In addition to the foregoing shortcomings, Mr. Murray admits that he 
never inquired whether the Hospital conducted any tests on the ventilation of the new room or 
followed up on any testing of his own. 
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B. AGFA HAD A DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE EQUIPMENT. 
It is well established that a supplier of a chattel must exercise reasonable 
care to make the chattel safe for its intended use. Section 392 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
One who supplies chattels is liable to those for whose use the chattel is 
supplied, or to those whom he should expect to be in the vicinity of its 
probable use for bodily harm caused by the use of the chattel in the 
manner for which and by the persons for whose use the chattel is 
supplied if the supplier failed to exercise reasonable care to make the 
chattel safe for the use for which it was supplied . 
(Emphasis added.) This rule of law, like most - if not all - of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, had been accepted by this Court. See, Reynolds v. American 
Foundry & Mach. Co., 239 P.2d 209 (Utah 1952). In the present case, AGFA 
supplied the Curix daylight processor machine. In order for the Curix machine 
to be safely operated, there must be adequate ventilation provided to vent the 
processing fumes from the workplace. Mr. Murray was aware of this fact and 
admitted the same in his deposition. [R 1889-91] At least as a matter of 
triable fact, AGFA knew or should have known that its machine was not 
safe for use in the new mammography area. AGFA certainly seems to have 
failed to exercise reasonable care to make the Curix machine safe for the use 
for which it was supplied. 
Another example of AGFA's probable violation of the duty referenced in 
Section 392 has to do with an AGFA "vent kit" - part of the AGFA product line 
at all times material hereto. The vent kit consisted of internal PVC piping that 
connected with the machine's hose and ran up to the ceiling vent. When the 
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Curix machine was reinstalled in its new location, it did not include this 
equipment. As set forth above, AGFA had a duty to make sure the Curix 
machine could be safely operated in its new location. AGFA did not, as a 
matter of triable fact, exercise reasonable care in initially installing the Curix 
machine without the benefit of the vent kit (something AGFA added much later, 
after Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder had become ill). The ventilation kit was 
designed to exhaust chemical fumes emitted by the Curix machine and would, 
at least as a matter of triable fact, have improved the ventilation conditions. 
As Section 392 of the Restatement provides, AGFA'S duty not only 
applies to those, such as IHC, to whom AGFA supplied its chattels, but also to 
"those whom [AGFA] should expect to be in the vicinity of the chattel's use". 
Consequently, it is clear that AGFA owed a duty of care to Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder, employees of IHC, under this particular Restatement provision. 
C. AGFA HAD A DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM USING ITS MACHINE, 
AND ALLOWING ITS MACHINE TO BE USED, IN UNSAFE 
CONDITIONS. 
Section 307 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides as follows: 
It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether a human being or a 
thing, which the actor knows or should know to be so incompetent, 
inappropriate or defective that its use involves an unreasonable risk of 
harm to others. 
(Emphasis added.) AGFA used and allowed its Curix machine to be used 
when it knew or should have known that the machine was inappropriate to be 
operated in the subject workplace, which AGFA knew lacked adequate 
ventilation, when AGFA knew that operation under those conditions would 
involve an unreasonable risk of harm to those who worked in that workplace. 
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AGFA'S Tim Murray had knowledge and training regarding the necessity of 
adequate ventilation in the machine's operation. He knew, or should have 
known, of the danger of adverse health effects from chemical fumes emitted 
from the AGFA machine, and he had concerns, when he installed the machine 
in the new location, regarding the adequacy of the ventilation. Based upon 
such things as Mr. Murray's knowledge and training, and his suspicions 
regarding the inadequacy of the ventilation, AGFA had a duty to refrain from 
using its machine, and allowing its machine to be used in the subject 
workplace. AGFA was, as a matter of triable fact, negligent in operating the 
Curix machine, and allowing it to be operated, under the circumstances. 
D. AGFA OWED A DUTY TO MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER BY 
VIRTUE OF ITS CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR 
EMPLOYER. 
In Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,473 N.E.2d 421(111. 
1986), tenants of a warehouse sued a security company that installed and 
maintained a fire alarm system for another tenant. They alleged that the 
defendant's negligent installation and maintenance of the system caused them 
to suffer damages when a small, undetected fire became a major conflagration 
that destroyed the warehouse. The trial court dismissed the tenants ' action. 
The appellate court reversed, holding that "defendant should have recognized 
that the performance of its contractual obligations was necessary for the 
protection of third parties. The fact that plaintiffs were not parties to the 
contract did not negate the existence of a duty owed to them." 473 N.E. 2d at 
427, judgment affirmed 493 N.E.2d 1022 (1986). 
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Here, AGFA had a contractual relationship with IHC for the installation 
and service of the Curix machine. The reasonable performance of its contract 
with IHC, including properly equipping, installing, and servicing the Curix 
Machine, was necessary for the protection of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, 
employees of IHC known by AGFA to be working in the subject workplace. As 
in Scott, the fact that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were not parties to the contract 
does not negate the existence of a duty owed to them. 
Similarly, in Essex v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 399 A.2d 300 
(N.J.Super. 1979), the plaintiff brought an action against the telephone 
company when she fell over a telephone wire at the desk of her co-worker. The 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the telephone company and 
the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding as follows: 
[T]he defendant did owe a duty to the plaintiff, in that its activity had its 
basis in a contract between the plaintiffs employer and the defendant, 
negligent performance of which gave rise to a right of action by third 
persons such as plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care in the installation 
of telephones on the employer's premises in order to avoid damage or 
injury to all within the zone of hazard created by its activity, and whether 
it performed that duty was a questions for resolution by the jury. 
399 A.2d at 302 (Emphasis added). It is clear that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder 
were directly in the "zone of hazard" in their work with and near the Curix 
machine. Thus, AGFA may be held liable to Plaintiffs for its negligent 
performance of its contractual obligations to IHC, including, without limitation, 
the appropriate equipping, installation of and servicing of the Curix machine. 
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E. AGFA HAD A DUTY TO WARN MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER 
OF THE DANGERS OF WORKING NEAR THE CURIX MACHINE 
WITHOUT ADEQUATE VENTILATION. 
As stated, AGFA'S agent, Tim Murray, has admitted that he received 
training and instruction regarding the importance of adequate ventilation to 
the safe operation of the Curix machine, that he participated in the installation 
of that machine although he had concerns regarding the adequacy of the 
ventilation, and that he became even more concerned when Ms. Alder and 
Ms. Jones began to experience health problems in the workplace. In spite of 
his knowledge and concerns, he gave no warning to Ms. Jones or Ms. Alder, 
or their employer regarding the risks of working near the Curix machine 
without adequate ventilation. 
Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for 
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier 
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to 
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by 
the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for 
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be 
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is 
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous 
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
This Court has expressly approved, in Schneider v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 822, 
823 (Utah 1958), Section 388 of the Restatement of Torts. It is well accepted 
that negligence can be founded on unsafe warning practices regarding the use 
to which a chattel may be put. See, e.g., Hunnings v. Texaco Inc., 29 F.3d 
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1480, 1483 ( l l ^ C i r . 1994); and Clarke Industries, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 
591 So.2d 458, 460-61 (Ala. 1991) (R 2343-2358). There can be no serious 
dispute of the proposition that AGFA'S abject failure to warn of the risks 
associated with Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's use and operation of a piece of 
equipment AGFA provided, installed, and serviced, when it knew the machine 
was being operated with inadequate ventilation, subjects AGFA to liability. 
Based on one or more of the duty analyses set forth in this Part I of this 
Argument, the District Court erred when it concluded that AGFA owed no duty 
of care to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. 
II. THE TESTIMONY OF THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IS 
ADMISSIBLE AND CREATES GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
WITH RESPECT TO CAUSATION AND DAMAGES, 
In its Order granting summary judgment in favor of AGFA, the District 
Court ruled that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder could not establish causation 
because they could not prove that they were exposed to chemicals at any level, 
let alone at toxic levels. The District Court also ruled that Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder could not establish that they had been damaged because the medical 
evidence supporting their claims for damages is inadmissible. These rulings 
are erroneous, as explained below. 
A. THE MEDICAL TESTIMONY OF MS. JONES' AND MS. ALDER'S 
EXPERTS IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH LAW. 
The District Court ruled that the testimony of Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's 
treating health care providers and non-treating medical expert (Dr. Cullen) 
should be excluded because some of those witnesses have referred to the host 
of problems experienced by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder as "Multiple Chemical 
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Sensitivity." The District Court ruled that, since MCS is not widely accepted in 
the medical community as a valid disease entity, it is not a "scientifically 
reliable",diagnosis. 7 
In so ruling, the District Court ignored the constellation of long-
recognized and well-accepted, stand-apart conditions with which Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder have been diagnosed, as well as the limitations of the holding in 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). In Rimmasch, trial courts are 
limited in their gate-keeping function to reviewing the methods and techniques 
upon which an expert witness's conclusions and opinions are based. It cannot 
examine or judge the opinions and conclusions drawn from the methods and 
techniques employed; that assessment is the province of the jury. Id. 
The physicians in question have utilized the time-honored technique of 
"differential diagnosis" in reaching their opinions concerning these women's 
illnesses. As explained hereinabove (see discussion appearing at pages 7-21), 
this technique is considered to be a standard, scientifically reliable technique 
in the medical community. It has been widely accepted by courts across the 
7
 It is important to understand that Ms Jones and Ms Alder have been diagnosed with a host 
of separate ailments (including but not limited to sinus problems, respiratory problems, 
fatigue, and cognitive deficits), apart from the MCS diagnosis It is undisputed that these 
various conditions have long been recognized and accepted within the medical community as 
valid medical conditions And the success or failure of this Appeal should (regardless of the 
District Court's determination) by no means hinge on the question of whether MCS is a Valid 
disease entity." A ruling that, as a matter of law, MCS is not a "valid disease entity" (which 
Ms Jones and Ms. Alder contend would be an erroneous ruling) should go only to damages 
and not be deemed to be fatal to Ms Jones' and Ms Alder's claims 
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nation as a proper and valid basis for establishing a medical opinion. The 
District Court erred in excluding the medical testimony of the physicians. 
1. The Method of Differential Diagnosis Provides a Sound, 
Scientifically Established Basis for a Medical Opinion. 
In State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642 (Utah 2000), this Court made absolutely 
clear what it meant in Rimmasch. This Court explained that the Rimmasch 
analysis applies to the methods and/or techniques used by the expert in 
arriving at his/her opinion, not to the expert's opinion itself. In making this 
clarification, the Court stated: 
Rimmasch simply requires that the scientific principles underlying the 
expert's testimony be inherently reliable, not that the expert's actual 
testimony be inherently reliable. 
Adams, 5 P.3d at 644 (Emphasis added) (Citations omitted). See also: Kennedy 
v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998). In Kennedy, the court stated: 
Judges in jury trials should not exclude expert testimony simply because 
they disagree with the conclusions of the expert. The Daubert duty is to 
judge the reasoning used in forming an expert conclusion. The test is 
whether or not the reasoning is scientific and will assist the jury. If it 
satisfied these two requirements, then it is a matter for the finder of fact 
to decide what weight to accord the expert's testimony. In arriving at a 
conclusion, the factfinder may be confronted with opposing experts, 
additional tests, experiments, and publications, all of which may 
increase or lessen the value of the expert's testimony. But their presence 
should not preclude the admission of the expert's testimony—they go to 
the weight, not the admissibility. 
161 F.3d at 1230-31 (emphasis added). 
It is also well established that the standards set forth in Rimmasch are 
not intended to apply to all expert testimony. In Adams, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "Rimmasch is implicated only when the expert testimony is 
'based on newly discovered principles'." Adams, 5 P.3d at 644 (quoting 
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Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396; see also: State v. Kellev, 1 P.3d 546 (Utah 2000) 
(concluding Rimmasch is inapplicable where 'there is no plausible claim that 
the type of expert testimony offered by the prosecution was based on novel 
scientific principles or techniques'); Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1999) (refusing to even apply Rimmasch where expert's testimony was not 
based on novel scientific principles or techniques). Rimmasch is inapplicable 
in the present case inasmuch as the health care providers in question have 
employed diagnostic methods and techniques that are standard and well-
accepted in the medical community as being scientifically reliable. For 
example, Dr. Pompa administered a battery of neuropsychological tests that 
have been used and accepted within the medical community for decades in 
assessing the women's cognitive status. Similarly, the medical opinions given 
by Drs. Robinson, Bateman, Suruda, Gray and Cullen are based upon the 
differential diagnosis method of determining the cause of a patient's medical 
condition. The differential diagnosis technique is well recognized and accepted 
in the medical community as a standard and scientifically reliable method 
upon which to base an expert opinion. (See discussion of medical evidence 
appearing at pages 7-21, above.) 
In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999), the 
plaintiff worked in a plant where he was required to work with rubber gaskets 
that had been coated with talc for easier handling. During the course of 
handling these gaskets, he claimed he was brought into contact with high 
concentrations of airborne talc. He began to experience unrelenting sinus 
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problems and was eventually required to undergo several sinus surgeries in an 
attempt to alleviate his sinus pain. He claimed that the defendant's failure to 
warn him of the dangers of breathing airborne talc proximately caused the 
aggravation of his pre-existing sinus condition. The trial court allowed the 
plaintiffs expert, Dr. Isenhower, to testify that in his opinion the sinus 
problems experienced by the plaintiff were caused by the inhalation of airborne 
talc in the workplace. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that Dr. Isenhower's testimony should 
have been ruled inadmissible because it was not based upon reliable, scientific 
methodology: 
. . . Dr. Isenhower had no epidemiological studies, no peer-reviewed 
published studies, no animal studies, and no laboratory data to support 
a conclusion that the inhalation of talc caused [the plaintiffs] sinus 
disease. Further, [the defendant] continues, Dr. Isenhower did not have 
any tissue samples indicating that talc was found in [the plaintiffs] 
sinuses, nor did he have studies showing that talc, at any threshold 
level, causes sinus disease. Instead, Dr. Isenhower merely relied on a 
differential diagnosis—supported in part by the temporal relationship 
between [the plaintiffs] exposure to talc and the problems he experienced 
with his sinuses—in reaching the conclusion that [the plaintiffs] sinus 
problems were caused by his exposure to talc from [the defendant's] 
gaskets. 
Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262. The defendant argued that neither a differential 
diagnosis nor a temporal relationship between exposure and onset or 
worsening of symptoms was sufficient to establish the reliability of 
Dr. Isenhower's opinion. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. 
In upholding the district court's admission of Dr. Isenhower's testimony, 
the appellate court held that a "[differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, 
is a standard, scientific technique . . ." Id, at 262 (emphasis added). The cases 
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that recognize differential diagnosis as a valid and reliable scientific technique 
upon which an expert may base an opinion are legion. See, e.g., McCullock v. 
H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2nd Cir. 1995); Glaser v. Thompson Med. 
Co., 32 F.3d 969, 978 (6th Cir. 1994} (recognizing that differential diagnosis is a 
standard diagnostic tool used by medical professionals to diagnose the most 
likely cause of illness, injury and disease); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 
F.3d 717, 758 (3rd Cir. 1994) (stating that the technique of differential 
diagnosis "has wide acceptance in the medical community, has been subject to 
peer review, and does not frequently lead to incorrect results/'); Heller v. Shaw 
Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3rd Cir. 1999) (concluding that a proper 
differential diagnosis is adequate to support expert medical opinion on 
causation and further noting that "differential diagnosis consists of a testable 
hypothesis, has been peer reviewed, contains standards for controlling its 
operation, is generally accepted, and is used outside of the judicial context"); 
Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C, Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1383-85 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that expert testimony by treating physician concerning the cause of the 
plaintiffs liver failure—acetaminophen combined with alcohol—was admissible 
despite the lack of epidemiological data); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 
1226, 1228-30 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding district court abused its discretion in 
excluding an expert opinion on causation based upon a differential diagnosis); 
Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 252-53 (1 s t Cir. 
1998)(determining that a differential diagnosis rendered expert opinion on 
causation sufficiently reliable for admission); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 
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F.3d 381, 385-87 (2nd Cir. 1998) (upholding determination that expert opinion 
was reliable in part based on differential diagnosis); and Ambrosini v. 
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that because 
expert opinion was based on differential diagnosis, district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to admit it.) 
It is abundantly clear that the technique of differential diagnosis is a 
widely accepted, reliable, scientific method upon which medical opinions may 
properly be based, and the District Court erred in its implicit ruling to the 
contrary. 
Furthermore, a physician's testimony based upon a differential diagnosis 
need not be supported by medical literature. In McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 
61 F.3d 1038 (2nd Cir. 1995), the plaintiff developed polyps in her throat after 
being exposed to glue fumes in her workplace. The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the medical testimony of the plaintiffs physician, based upon 
a differential diagnosis of the plaintiffs illness, was admissible in spite of the 
fact that the physician could not point to a single piece of medical literature 
establishing that glue fumes cause throat polyps. 61 F.3d at 1043-44. In 
allowing the physician's testimony, the court held that "disputes as to the 
strength of his credentials, faults in his use of differential etiology as a 
methodology or the lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the 
weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony." Id. 
In Zuchowiczv. U.S., 140 F.3d 381 (2nd Cir. 1998), the plaintiff developed 
primary pulmonary hypertension ("PPH") eight months after taking an overdose 
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of a prescription drug called Danocrine and died two years later as a result of 
PPH. At trial the defendant attempted to exclude medical testimony that the 
overdose caused the plaintiff to develop the PPH that eventually resulted in her 
death. In support of its contention that such testimony should be excluded, 
the defendant argued that since Danocrine had never been previously linked to 
PPH, any conclusion that the Danocrine overdose more likely than not caused 
the plaintiffs illness was clearly erroneous. The Second Circuit disagreed. 
In holding that the medical testimony was admissible, the court stated 
that "it is well established that causation 'may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence' (citations omitted) and that 'the causal relation between an injury and 
its later physical effects may be established by the direct opinion of a 
physician, by his deduction by the process of eliminating causes other 
than the traumatic agency, or by his opinion based upon a hypothetical 
question'/' Zuchowicz v. U.S., 140 F.3d 381, 389 (quoting Shelnitz v. 
Greenberg, 509 A.2d 1023, 1027 (Conn. 1986). 
In Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. 1999), the court 
held as follows: 
Given the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the flexible 
nature of the Daubert inquiry, and the proper roles of the judge and the 
jury in evaluating the ultimate credibility of an expert's opinion, we do 
not believe that a medical expert must always cite published studies on 
general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular object 
caused a particular illness. Cf. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 
1038, 1043 (2nd Cir. 1995) (affirming admission of treating doctor's 
testimony despite the fact that he "could not point to a single piece of 
medical literature that says glue fumes cause throat polyps"). To so hold 
would doom from the outset all cases in which the state of research on 
the specific ailment or on the alleged causal agent was in its early stages, 
and would effectively resurrect a Fme-like bright-line standard, not by 
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requiring that a methodology be "generally accepted," but by excluding 
expert testimony not backed by published (and presumably peer-
reviewed) studies. 
167 F.3d at 155 (Emphasis added). In addition, the court explained that in the 
actual practice of medicine, "physicians do not wait for conclusive, or even 
published and peer-reviewed, studies to make diagnoses to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty/' Id. (Emphasis added.) The court found those 
diagnoses to be valid stating as follows: 
However, experience with hundreds of patients, discussions with peers, 
attendance at conferences and seminars, detailed review of a patient's 
family, personal and medical histories, and thorough physical 
examinations are the tools of the trade, and should suffice for the 
making of a differential diagnosis even in those cases in which peer-
reviewed studies do not exist to confirm the diagnosis of the 
physician. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
In Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226 (9* Cir. 1998), the plaintiff 
alleged that collagen injections caused her atypical systemic lupus 
erythematosus (SLE). In holding that the medical expert's testimony that 
collagen injections caused the plaintiffs SLE was supported by scientific 
evidence, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
Not knowing the mechanism whereby a particular agent causes a 
particular effect is not always fatal to a plaintiffs claim. Causation can 
be proved even when we don't know precisely how the damage occurred, 
if there is sufficiently compelling proof that the agent must have caused 
the damage somehow. 
Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1230 (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, there is compelling evidence that the illnesses 
suffered by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder resulted from their exposure to chemicals 
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in their workplace. Compelling evidence consists of their work histories, 
medical histories, simultaneous onset of nearly identical symptoms, the 
established lack of adequate ventilation in the subject workplace, and the 
testimony of many of their treating physicians. 
2. Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's Subjective Complaints 
and Self-Reporting Are Valid Basis for Differential 
Diagnosis. 
It is well established that a person's own subjective complaints and self-
reporting of his /her own medical history provide a valid basis for a physician's 
differential diagnosis. Any inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the subjective 
information provided by the plaintiff properly constitute a subject of cross-
examination and does not affect the admissibility of an opinion based upon a 
differential diagnosis. See, Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., 211 F.3d 1008 (7th 
Cir. 1999). In Cooper, the plaintiff attempted to establish that he was suffering 
from chronic pain syndrome ("CPS") and that this condition was caused by his 
fall. The district court refused to admit the expert medical testimony 
concluding that because the physicians relied on the plaintiffs self-reporting 
about his past medical history as the basis for their diagnoses that the 
plaintiffs fall caused his CPS, the physicians had no scientific basis for their 
testimony. In addition, the defendant argued: 
. . . not all CPS patients can point to a particular event as the cause of 
their condition and . . . emotional factors have been known to play a role 
in the onset of the condition . . . Dr. Richardson had not taken into 
account the possible effect of such other factors in [the plaintiffs] life on 
the onset of the condition. Indeed . . . Dr. Richardson made no critical 
evaluation of the cause of [the plaintiffs] CPS because it was not 
necessary to his treatment of the condition that he know with any 
certainty its cause . . . Dr. Richardson's "post hoc, propter hoc" 
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determination of cause, although perhaps an acceptable methodology in 
cases in which the mechanism of injury is understood, is not adequate in 
cases such as this one in which that mechanism is not understood. 
Cooper, 211 F.3d at 1020. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. 
In holding that the medical testimony was admissible, the Cooper court 
stated that "here, a physician employed the accepted diagnostic tool of 
examination accompanied by physical history as related by the patient." Id. 
The Court further stated: 
. . . the methodology of physical examination and self-reported medical 
history employed by Dr. Richardson is generally appropriate. Although 
[the defendant] disputes the acceptability of such an approach in the 
case of conditions whose etiologies are less specific, it suggests no 
alternative that could be employed by the conscientious clinical 
physician in this situation.8 
Id. In the present case, the trial court concluded that since the etiology of MCS 
is not well known or established, the medical testimony in this case should be 
disregarded. That position was rejected by the Cooper court and should be 
rejected in this case as well. The Cooper court acknowledged that a patient's 
subjective complaints and self-reported medical history was a sufficient basis 
for medical testimony regarding the patient's chronic pain syndrome. Id. 
Furthermore, the Cooper court went on to say that the possibility of the 
plaintiff's CPS being attributable to factors other than the fall, as well a s the 
accuracy and truthfulness of the plaintiffs self-reported medical history, were 
both susceptible to exploration on cross-examination by opposing counsel. Id. 
8
 It may be significant that the court admitted the medical testimony in spite of the fact that 
CPS is not accepted by the entire medical community and has a vague and wide-ranging 
etiology. 
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Therefore, the defendant's contention that other conditions might have caused 
his CPS "goes to the weight of the medical testimony, not its admissibility . . . 
the proper method of attacking evidence that is admissible but subject to doubt 
is to cross-examine vigorously, to present contrary evidence, and to give careful 
instructions on the burden of proof." Id. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that differential diagnosis is a well-
accepted, scientific method of treating patients and provides a valid basis for 
the admission of medical testimony. Consequently, the District Court erred in 
ruling to exclude the testimony of Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's treating 
physicians and medical experts who employed the differential diagnosis 
method in their treatment of these women and based their medical opinions on 
the same. 
B. THE INABILITY OF MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER TO 
ESTABLISH THE EXACT LEVELS OF THEIR CHEMICAL 
EXPOSURE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THEM FROM 
ESTABLISHING CAUSATION 
The District Court erred when it concluded that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder 
cannot establish causation without proving the exact level of chemicals to 
which they were exposed. It is well established that Daubert-type opinions 
emphasize that "causation need not be established to a high degree of certainty 
for expert testimony to be admissible . . ." Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1230 (citing 
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 at 590 (1993)). 
Indeed, "it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific 
testimony must be 'known' to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in 
science." Id. Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's inability to establish the exact levels 
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of chemicals to which they were exposed over the course of the two-year period 
they worked in LDS Hospital's new Mammography department is through no 
fault of their own and is not fatal to their claims. Standards created by 
governmental and/or administrative agencies are, at least arguably, the 
product of a political process and not "scientific" in nature. (See, e.g., Dr. 
Gray's testimony, R. at 2070-72). They do not even purport to stand for the 
proposition that exposure to levels lower than those established as "standards" 
cannot cause injury. 
In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999), the 
defendant argued that the medical expert's testimony should be excluded 
because he had "no means of accurately assessing what level of exposure was 
adequate to produce the sinus irritation [the plaintiff] experienced." 178 F.3d at 
263. In holding that the medical testimony was admissible, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated the following truth: 
But it must also be recognized that only rarely are humans exposed to 
chemicals in a manner that performs a quantitative determination of 
adverse outcomes. Human exposure occurs most frequently in 
occupational settings where workers are exposed to industrial chemicals; 
however, even under these circumstances, it is usually difficult, if 
not impossible, to quantify the amount of exposure. 
Id., (emphasis added). In Westberry, no formal testing for levels of talc in the 
plaintiffs workplace was performed; nor was there any medical literature 
supporting the proposition that exposure to talc could result in sinus disease. 
Yet the court did not allow the lack of that specific evidence to defeat the 
plaintiffs claim. 
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Similarly, in McCullock v. H.B. Fuller, Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2nd Cir. 1995, 
no evidence was presented with respect to the levels of chemicals from the 
"hot-glue" fumes that were present in the plaintiffs workplace prior to her 
developing polyps in her throat; nor was there any medical literature that says 
glue fumes cause throat polyps. The court nonetheless held that the medical 
expert's testimony, which was based upon a differential diagnosis, was reliable 
and admissible even in the absence of evidence pertaining to specific exposure 
levels. 61 F.3d at 1043-44. 
There is evidence, in this case, that the subject workplace had only two 
air exchanges per hour from the time the Curix machine was relocated to the 
subject workplace in 1993 until 1995, when the ventilation problems in the 
workplace were finally addressed with at least some degree of efficacy. This 
evidence may be significant, for causation purposes, in light of AGFA's 
installation specification requirements, which require at least 10-15 air 
exchanges per hour. In addition, there is evidence that there was a "chemical 
smell" in the subject workplace during the relevant time frame. [R 1974] The 
chemical modules studied by AGFA's service representatives indicate that 
adequate ventilation is necessary to prevent negative health effects from 
chemical exposure. Similar to the facts in Kannankeril v. Terminix 
International Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3rd Cir. 1997), the only formal testing of the 
chemical levels in Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's workplace was performed after 
the ventilation problems were remedied and revealed only negligible amounts of 
chemical fumes. As the court determined in Kannankeril, any claimed 
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shortcoming pertaining to evidence regarding the exposure Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder experienced goes to the credibility and weight of the evidence, not to its 
admissibility. 
In Curtis v. M& S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999), the court 
held that the law did not require the plaintiffs in that case to show the precise 
level of chemicals to which they were exposed. 174 F.3d at 671 (citing Lakie v. 
Smithkline Beecham, 965 F.Supp. 49, 58 (D.D.C. 1997)). In Curtis, the 
plaintiffs were exposed to benzene in their workplace. No measurements were 
taken of the benzene levels present in the workplace at the time of the 
plaintiffs' exposure. In spite of this fact, the court allowed the plaintiffs' 
medical expert to testify that the plaintiffs had been exposed to harmful levels 
of benzene. The plaintiffs' medical expert based this conclusion on the 
symptoms that the plaintiffs were experiencing: 
Dr. Stevens found the symptoms experienced by the refinery workers to 
be extremely important. He testified that the cluster of symptoms that 
the refinery workers began experiencing shortly after HAD was 
introduced into the refinery—headache, nausea, disorientation, and 
fatigue—are well known symptoms of overexposure to benzene. 
174 F.3d at 671. The court found that the plaintiffs' symptoms constituted a 
valid basis for Dr. Stevens' conclusion that the plaintiffs were exposed to 
harmful levels of benzene and allowed him to so testify. 
Governmental and industry standards are, at least as a matter of triable 
fact, not scientifically based, and serious injury can result from exposure to 
levels below formally promulgated standards. The standards, themselves, are 
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not dispositive of the question of whether Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder became ill 
by reason of exposure to toxic chemical fumes in their workplace. 
Dr. Gray testified that threshold limit values (TLVs) for chemicals are set 
by the American Congress of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) and 
are not based upon a scientific process, but rather a political process; he has 
witnessed TLVs drop significantly over the decades of his medical practice; he 
testified that there have been recent allegations that the individual who chaired 
the committee that was endorsing threshold limit values was not doing valid 
science and has come under serious scrutiny. [R 2070-72] Dr. Gray further 
testified that Peak Exposure Levels (PELs) represent the highest level an 
individual should be exposed to for a short 10-15 minute time frame within an 
eight hour work day. Dr. Gray has witnessed the PEL for lead drop from 60 to 
10 over the last twenty years. [R 2072-73] With respect to TLV and PEL levels, 
Dr. Gray testified as follows: 
My opinion with regard to threshold limit values and PELs with respect 
to glutaraldehyde is that with regard to immune function, the agencies 
and entities which establish those standards did not adequately 
contemplate the interaction of these compounds with the immune 
system. And I do not believe that the values that we are seeing 
published . . . adequately protect the immune system or people's immune 
systems when they are exposed at those levels. 
[R 2075] 
According to Dr. Gray, none of the standards purporting to reflect safe 
exposure levels to chemicals can be relied on "because none of the agencies to 
date are using health-based standards when they are establishing acceptable 
exposure limits. [R 2076] The only way to ensure a "zero effect" from chemical 
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exposure is to have "zero exposure." [R 2077-78] In Dr. Gray's opinion, if 
there is any detectable level of glutaraldehyde or formaldehyde, one cannot 
assure a zero effect. [R 2077-78] Furthermore, Dr. Gray believes that there is 
no safe level for exposure to hydroquinone. [R 2074] 
Dr. Gray believes it is highly significant that Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder were able to work for so many years in their field without problems 
and then, with the relocation of their workplace to a room with 
inadequate ventilation, their illnesses and problems began to arise. [R 
2089]] Dr. Gray testified that "dose" data pertaining to a patient's chemical 
exposure are usually not available, so a physician must rely upon information 
in the literature regarding what happens at various dose levels with different 
compounds and compare that to the patient's symptoms. [R 2065-67] Dr. Gray 
further opined as follows: 
If we know for a certainty that the compound is present, regardless of 
our ability to quantitate it, we have to be concerned about and be ready 
to draw causal conclusions about the impact of the presence of that 
compound if characteristic clinical findings are present in the subjects 
that we are studying. To do less than that is to be seriously 
irresponsible. 
[R 2069] 
In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), this Court recognized a 
similar principle in holding that compliance with building codes did not 
necessarily indicate a lack of negligence. Specifically, the Court held: 
. . . compliance with the building code does not ipso facto preclude a 
finding of a design defect. If a reasonably prudent person should have 
known, or could have learned by the exercise of reasonable care, that the 
design or construction of the window constituted a dangerous condition, 
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the landlord could be held liable for not taking adequate safety 
precautions. 
699 P.2d at 728. The general principle stated in Williams can be applied 
here. AGFA knew, or should by the exercise of reasonable care have known, 
that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were getting sick as a result of their exposure to 
chemical fumes. Consequently, even if the chemical levels were in compliance 
with industry and governmental standards throughout the time of exposure 
(something that AGFA cannot prove), that would not relieve AGFA from liability 
for failing to take adequate safety precautions in ensuring that adequate 
ventilation was being provided in the workplace. As in the commonly and 
widely accepted "egg-shell skuir example (see, e.g., Biswell v. Duncan, 742 
P.2d 80 (Utah 1987)), a tortfeasor must take its victims as it finds them. Thus, 
even if Ms. Jones and/or Ms. Alder were predisposed to being particularly 
sensitive to chemicals, that fact does not absolve AGFA from its duty to act 
reasonably in addressing Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's workplace ventilation 
needs. Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's inability to establish the exact levels of 
chemicals to which they were exposed does not preclude their ability to 
establish causation, and the trial court's ruling to the contrary is erroneous. 
a ADDITIONAL FACTORS ESTABLISHING CAUSATION. 
The temporal relationship between the illnesses at issue and the 
relocation of the Curix machine to the room with inadequate ventilation is 
evidence of causation. It is well accepted that "a temporal relationship between 
exposure to a substance and the onset of a disease or a worsening of symptoms 
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can provide compelling evidence of causation." Westberry, 178 F.3d at 265 
(Emphasis added). See also: Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 385, 390. 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder had worked as x-ray technologists for many 
years with no symptoms of significant illness related to chemical exposure. 
Then, after the Curix machine was relocated to the new mammography 
department and installed in the room with inadequate ventilation, Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder both began to experience such symptoms. At first, Ms. Jones ' 
and Ms. Alder's symptoms would disappear within a few hours after leaving 
their workplace and would return within a few hours of returning to their 
workplace. 9 As time went on, however, the symptoms became constant and 
did not dissipate after an extended period of time away from the workplace. 
The fact that both women were experiencing the same phenomenon (albeit with 
some variations in their exact symptoms), at the same time, and only upon the 
relocation of the Curix machine to the unventilated room, may fairly be 
considered compelling evidence of causation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the District Court's ruling, AGFA owed, under one or more 
theories, duties of care to Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones. Contrary to the District 
Court's ruling, triable questions of fact on the pertinent illness causation 
issues prevented the District Court from correctly granting summary judgment. 
9
 Similarly, in Westberry, (discussed at pages 34, 35 and 43, above) Dr. Isenhower 
experimented with keeping Mr. Westberry out of work and noticed that his sinus condition 
improved when he was not working but worsened when he returned. Under these 
circumstances, the court concluded "that the temporal relationship between Westberry's 
exposure and the onset and worsening of his sinus disease provided support for Dr. 
Isenhower's opinion that talc was the source of the problem. 178 F.3d at 265. 
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Ms. J o n e s ' and Ms. Alder's treating health care providers (with one exception -
Dr. Pompa - medical doctors), as well as their non-treating medical expert, Dr. 
Cullen, have scientifically valid, important, and admissible things to say about 
these women, whose careers were cut short and who have been gravely 
damaged through no fault of their own. Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder urge the 
Court, based on the foregoing analysis, and in the interest of justice, to reverse 
the District court 's granting of summary judgment and to remand this case for 
trial. 
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ADDENDUM 
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I L W . H I I , , I C T COURT 
Third Judicial District 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPAR 
LESLIE ALDER and JACKIE JONES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MILES, INC., a corporation, AGFA 
CORPORATION, a corporation, and BAYER 
CORPORATION, a corporation 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 950907675 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
On September 26,2000 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the above 
entitled Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. Defendants were represented by 
Gordon Roberts, David Bennion and Stephen Traflet and plaintiffs were represented by Peter Collins 
and Jackie Carmichael. Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
In Utah, a plaintiff must establish four elements to state a claim of negligence: " (1) a duty 
of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation, 
both actually and proximately, of the injury; and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff." 
Weber v Springville City, 725 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1986). Consequently, summary judgment is 
appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, because 
the complete failure of proof on an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial." Schafir vHarrigan 879 P.2d 1384 (1994)(citing, Celotex Corp. 
- - ^ J O 
v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)). Plaintiffs fail to establish several 
elements essential to their claim of negligence. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is granted. 
An essential element of a negligence claim is a duty of reasonable care. "Absent a showing 
of duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover." Sliszev Stanley-Bostich 979 P.2d 317 (1999) (quoting, AMS 
Salt Indus. V. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942P.2d315, 319 (Utah 1997)). Plaintiffs fail to prove that 
defendants had a duty to control the operation or installation of the ventilation system. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs fail to persuade this Court that any legally cognizable duty, sufficient to support a claim 
of negligence, exists between the plaintiffs and defendant. 
Another critical element of a negligence claim is causation. In this case, plaintiffs have the 
burden of proving both that they were exposed to chemicals and that the levels of exposure causes 
known toxic effects. At the hearing and in supporting memorandum plaintiffs fail to meet this 
burden. Specifically, plaintiffs are unable to prove exposure to any chemicals, let alone levels 
known to cause known toxic effects. 
Finally, to prevail in a negligence claim, plaintiffs must prove damages. Plaintiffs assert that 
repeated chemical exposure caused them to develop significant health problems, primarily, Multiple 
Chemical Sensitivity, or "MCS"1. MCS is a controversial diagnosis that has been excluded in 
numerous jurisdictions for lack of sound scientific reasoning and methodology. See generally, 
Bradley v Brown 42 F.3d 434 (1994), Summers v Missouri Pacific Railroad System 132 F.3d 599 
*In addition to MCS, Dr. Deborah Robinson, diagnosed both plaintiffs with chronic 
fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia while Dr Janiece Pompa diagnosed plaintiff Jones with 
cognitive deficits. These diagnoses appear to essentially be MCS couched in different terms. 
Plaintiffs own experts admits that all of the illnesses display nearly identical symptoms and show 
significant overlap in numerous other respects. 
i, ,L v., J ; 
(1997), Collins v Welch 178 Misc.2d 107, Treadwell vDow-United Technologies 970 F. Supp 974 
(M.D.Ala. 1997). Furthermore, numerous medical organizations, including the American Medical 
Association, refuse to accept MCS as a valid and reliable diagnosis. After careful consideration, 
this Court concludes that plaintiffs evidence and testimony offered in support of MCS is not 
admissible. Plaintiffs evidence is not based upon inherently reliable scientific or medical foundation 
as required under Rimmasch and Utah Rules of Evidence 702. Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to 
establish the existence of damages, an element essential to their claim of negligence. 
Therefore, for the above mentioned reasons, the Court having reviewed the legal memoranda, 
affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties, and being fully advised, concludes that plaintiff has 
failed to prove a legal cause of action for negligence and accordingly defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be granted. 
j &£** 
Dated this y day of^rfy, 2000. 
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